Beyond Borders: Turkey’s Rise as a Proxy Power

Without a strong, unified security system, maintaining stability in the Middle East falls to a mix
of regional and global powers. Their actions, often short-term and tactical, cast a long shadow of
war and uncertainty over the region.

Faezeh Ghasemi

This geopolitical landscape is further muddied by a complex web of non-state actors (NSAs) – militias, insurgent groups and even private military companies (PMCs). These actors blur the lines between local conflicts and regional power struggles. Established regional powers have long been players in this complex game, while others have recently entered the fray.

The Rise of Turkish Proxy Power

Historically, regional powers like Saudi Arabia nurtured proxy forces, such as those used against
the Soviets, inadvertently leading to the rise of extremist groups like Al-Qaeda. Pakistan fostered the Taliban to counter India’s influence. Iran employs similar tactics with groups in Lebanon and
elsewhere. Turkey, however, is a relative newcomer to this game.
Turkey’s failure to gain admission to the European Union ultimately reshaped the political
landscape in Ankara. This is perceived by some as a factor in the rise of President Erdogan and
his brand of politics, often referred to as “Erdoganism.”

Turkey initially pursued a “zero problems with neighbours” policy, aiming to be a successful model for the Islamic world. Nevertheless, the dynamics in the Middle East present a more intricate landscape than that of Europe, prompting Turkey to engage in a new geopolitical paradigm.

The Arab Spring uprisings presented both challenges and opportunities for Turkey, particularly
for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Erdogan. Witnessing the regional
influence wielded by powers like Iran through proxy forces on those years likely played a role in
shaping Turkish policy. Under Erdogan, Turkey has become a significant player, strategically
deploying NSAs to further its interests across the region.

Turkey’s Shifting Role in Syria

Initially cautious, Turkey eventually entered the Syrian conflict by backing opposition groups.
Turkey’s support initially went to moderate groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the
Syrian National Army (SNA). However, over time, Ankara’s strategy broadened to include some
extremist elements. Initially targeting the established regime of Bashar al-Assad, these supports gradually shifted Turkey’s focus towards countering Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The rise of extremist factions inadvertently undermined the Kurdish secular groups and also secular culture of this
region. While the Turkish government has not formally acknowledged this stance, documentation from
certain regional governments and assertions from The Syrian Democratic Forces suggest that Turkey likely backs certain extremist Islamist factions like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to combat the
Kurds.

Libya: Testing Ground for Proxy Play

The 2011 uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi plunged Libya into a brutal civil war. Initially
hesitant, Turkey eventually threw its support behind the Islamist-leaning Government of
National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. This decision was not purely ideological. Turkey saw an
opportunity to secure lucrative energy deals with the GNA and counter the influence of regional
rivals like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who were backing the rival
eastern faction led by Khalifa Haftar.
Turkey’s support for the GNA went beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Ankara deployed military
advisors, stationed drones, and, most significantly, facilitated the transfer of Syrian opposition
fighters under the banner of the Syrian National Army (SNA). This influx of Syrian rebels, some
trained by companies like SADAT Defense—Turkey’s first and only international PMC offering
military training and logistical services—played a key role in tipping the fragile balance in the
GNA’s favor before 2020 ceasefire.

Swift Triumph in Karabakh

Turkey’s proxy strategies extended beyond North Africa. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ankara emerged as a steadfast supporter of
Azerbaijan, a nation sharing close ethnic and cultural bonds with Turkey. This support
transcended mere rhetoric. Turkish drones, deployed with devastating impact, played a pivotal
role in Azerbaijan’s territorial acquisitions. Additionally, unofficial reports surfaced in regional
media outlets suggesting that Syrian rebel fighters, potentially under Turkish supervision, had
joined the conflict alongside Azerbaijani forces. The developments in Karabakh were a testament to Turkey’s experiential learning from its engagements in Syria and Libya. Ankara enlisted certain proxy groups in this delicate conflict, some of whom had previously been involved in engagements in Syria and Libya aligned with Turkish interests. This marked a significant achievement for Turkey, as it secured victory at minimal cost without formal military involvement. Turkey was successful in fortifying the
alliance of Turkic-speaking nations, countering Russian and Iranian influence in the South
Caucasus, and concurrently enhancing influence in Armenia—an erstwhile ally of Iran and
Russia.

Challenges and Perils of Proxy Warfare

Erdogan’s utilization of proxy groups has yielded tactical triumphs with relatively modest
expense. The sphere of Turkish influence stretches from the Mediterranean to the borders of Iran
in the west and as far as Central Asia, towards Afghanistan.
In this context, in addition to its proxis, the neo-Ottoman ideology and a fusion with Turkish
nationalism, Turkey leverages tools like the economy and arms sales to succeed.

Everything seems perfect. However, this approach carries significant risks, echoing the perils faced by other nations that have relied on proxy battles in the past.

Foremost among these risks is the uncertain long-term implications of bolstering non-state
actors, particularly those espousing extremist ideologies. For instance, in Pakistan, government
support for the Afghan Taliban has spawned extremist factions like the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, posing a severe threat to the stability of the Islamabad government. Similarly, in
Russia, the Wagner Group eventually turned against its benefactor, Putin, foreshadowing the
potential for such proxy groups to rebel against their patrons.

The second consideration is that proxy wars heighten regional tensions and escalate the risk of
unintended consequences and broader conflicts.

These proxy groups occasionally operate with a level of autonomy from their sponsoring nations, which intertwines the interests of both parties. This scenario has repeatedly surfaced in discussions surrounding recent conflicts such as the Gaza war and the role of Hamas as a proxy entity.

Were the supporting governments truly orchestrating the attacks on October 7? While the specifics remain ambiguous, the accusatory gaze often falls on the nations backing Hamas.

The third aspect pertains to the substantial costs associated with backing these proxy groups.
While under favorable economic circumstances, such groups may curtail the military
expenditures of state actors, public discontent often arises when a country’s financial stability is
jeopardized due to its support for such entities.

Communities frequently disapprove of their government’s financial backing of external proxy groups during economic challenges, as these groups are seldom considered integral parts of national defence forces.
Furthermore, reliance on proxy groups, a burgeoning component of the Middle East security
culture, diminishes the efficacy of diplomatic solutions in de-escalating tensions. The
proliferation of these proxy entities in the region, often bolstered by various nations or
manipulated as pawns by external governments, can spiral situations out of control.

This trend raises apprehensions about the emergence of a lawless environment akin to the “Wild West” in the inherently volatile Middle East. Notably, these groups obscure the visibility of conflicts,
undermining transparency and accountability. In circumstances where the entity behind the
scenes remains ambiguous and governments fail to exercise due responsibility for the actions of their proxies, international efforts to regulate the use of force suffer a dilution in both legal and
political efficacy.

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.