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The Syrian Civil War has fractured the nation like a shattered kaleidoscope.
In the north and east, a dizzying array of armed factions have emerged, each vying for a piece of the broken power mosaic.
President Bashar al-Assad, shielded by Russia’s military might, holds dominion over roughly 70%
of Syria. Here, a semblance of order prevails as Assad slowly rebuilds his forces.
Bashar al-Assad’s power does not extend to the skies of Syria; rather, the airspace of the country is controlled by Russian forces.
Beyond this limited government-controlled sphere lies a stark contrast. In places like Idlib, Hasakah, Raqqa, and Afrin, the landscape is a tangled web of competing militias. To understand the complexity of the situation, we must dissect thoroughly the underlying social forces that shape the identities and interests of the various groups involved.
These social forces are the very root systems from which the diverse militias have sprouted, with their ideologies and allegiances deeply intertwined with the social fabric of the region. Examining these social forces is key to understanding the groups and their ever-shifting alliances. It is these foundational elements that have given rise to the specific roots of the militia groups.
The most important of these social forces are:
Tribal Legacy: Tribal structures have long played a social and political role in the region. The war
reignited these ancient affiliations. Sunni Arab tribes, like the powerful Shammar and Anze, saw
an opportunity to reclaim influence lost under the Assad regime. The Shammar tribe is a
sprawling nomadic confederation that has wielded significant influence across parts of Syria, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia for centuries. Their tribal identity and power structures have been a key factor
in the emergence and behavior of certain militia groups, with the Shammar both providing
recruits and serving as power brokers between different factions. The Shammar’s vast tribal
networks and history of resisting central authority have made them an important social force to
reckon with. Similarly, the Anza tribe, which is concentrated in eastern Syria and western Iraq, has been a major player in the social dynamics fuelling the various militia movements. The Anza tribes have
long-standing rivalries and alliances with other Sunni Arab groups that have manifested in the
allegiances and operations of the militias. Their tribal loyalties and local power bases have shaped
the ideological leanings and operational zones of certain militia factions. The tribes have extensive patronage networks that allow them to provide financial support, weapons, and other resources to militia members. They can also leverage tribal politics and disputes to manipulate the rivalries between different militia factions.
Shammer and Anza wide-ranging social networks and deep understanding of the local terrain on
both sides of the Syria-Iraq border enable them to supply militias with crucial information about
enemy activities, secure routes, and strategic locations. This has significantly bolstered the
operational effectiveness of the militias. These groups often formed localized militias, focused
on protecting their communities and sometimes aligning with external actors like Turkey based
on shared interests.
Voices from Kurds: Not only Arab tribes resist the policies of the “modern centralized state.” In
a similar vein, the Kurdish forces in northern Syria have embraced a specific ideology aimed at
establishing a region with local governance. The Kurdish struggle for autonomy has a long history.
The brutal suppression of Kurdish uprisings in the 20th century fueled resentment and a desire
for self-determination. This birthed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist
organization by many nations. The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), though seen as
a more moderate offshoot, is viewed with suspicion by Turkey due to its perceived links to the
PKK. This historical tension heavily influences the PYD’s search for international allies, pushing them towards actors like the US, who offered support in the fight against ISIS.
A Fading Influence of left tradition: The Syrian Civil War undoubtedly fractured the leftist
movement. The Assad regime, while nominally socialist, has increasingly relied on authoritarian
tactics and aligned itself with more conservative forces. This alienated many who initially
believed in the regime’s leftist ideals. Additionally, the rise of Islamist groups further marginalized
leftist factions. While remnants of leftist ideology persist within some Kurdish and Assyrian
militias, their influence has waned compared to the dominance of tribalism and Kurdish
nationalism in shaping the current militia landscape.
Each Militias and their allies in North and East Syria are key players shaped by these historical
roots. Their narratives, ideologies, and histories intertwine to create a complex network of
interactions. Years of being marginalized by the Syrian government have fuelled the emergence
of distinct identity groups such as Islamists, Arab nationalists, Kurdish nationalists, and Turkmen
militias, each with their own unique goals. These identities continue to evolve through
interactions with one another and external actors like Turkey. Their relationships, perceptions,
and interactions are influenced by historical memories of their people while also adapting within
the context of ongoing conflicts.
In the volatile region of North and East Syria, Islamist militias present a complex and multifaceted
challenge. While certain factions, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly known as al-Nusra
Front), adhere strictly to jihadist ideologies, others exist along a spectrum of Islamist beliefs,
creating a nuanced balance of power and influence.
The province of Idlib, in particular, has emerged as a diverse hub for these groups. The lurking
presence of ISIS sleeper cells poses a significant and immediate threat. However, the danger goes
beyond these extremist elements. The most concerning aspect is the shifting ideological stances
of various groups. Even Arab nationalist militias in the area implement aspects of Sharia law and
exhibit Islamic extremism within their spheres of influence.
For the weary populace, who have endured years of suffering under both ISIS and the Assad
regime, ideological purity has taken a backseat to pragmatism. The provision of basic services
and a semblance of security has become the overriding priority. Whether these necessities are
delivered by Islamists or other factions seems to matter less in the face of their shared struggle
for survival.
This complex reality presents a formidable challenge to international actors seeking to navigate
the Syrian conflict. Understanding the nuances of these Islamist militias and their relationship
with local populations is crucial to fostering a fragile stability in the region. While the threat of
extremism cannot be ignored, recognizing the pragmatic motivations of many groups and their
role in providing essential services may be necessary to avoid further destabilization and
suffering.
Groups like Ahrare al-Sham and Tahrir al-Sham further illustrate the fluidity of identity politics.
Ahrare al-Sham began as a moderate Islamist group but in a surprising twist, joined forces with
the extremist Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013. This risky move gave them power but also a terror label.
After a messy split in 2014, Ahrar al-Sham toned down the extremism to survive. Now they
navigate Syria’s murky political waters, even cooperating with the government at times.
Tahrir al-Sham, an offshoot of Jabhat al-Nusra, has also undergone ideological shifts, seeking to
distance itself from its al-Qaeda roots. Recent reports suggest a shift in HTS’s messaging and
actions. Leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani has emphasized “deterrence” and “defense” against
the Syrian government, downplaying talk of offensive operations. This suggests a potential focus
on maintaining control in Idlib rather than direct confrontation. Overall, recent developments
suggest HTS is prioritizing stability and public support within its areas of control, while still
engaging in some level of armed resistance. The group’s long-term goals and future trajectory
remain uncertain.
The Syrian National Army (SNA), an umbrella organization encompassing various armed factions,
exemplifies the inherent complexity of the conflict in Syria. While Turkey provides significant
material and financial support to the SNA, the organization is not a mere Turkish proxy. Each
constituent faction brings its own distinct agenda, ideological leanings, and local power dynamics
to the table, creating a potentially volatile mixture. The SNA is composed of two primary components: former Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups and hardline Islamist factions. The FSA groups trace their origins to the relatively moderate rebel forces that emerged in the early stages of the Syrian civil war in 2011-2012. During this period, the FSA functioned as a relatively cohesive military force, controlling territory and engaging in conventional warfare against the Syrian government. However, as the conflict dragged on, the FSA struggled with internal divisions, a lack of resources, and the rise of more extremist groups.
By 2015, the FSA had largely dissolved into a loose collection of local factions, with the label being
adopted by various groups, some of which are aligned with the Turkish-backed SNA, while others
operate independently. The original command structure of the FSA has since dissipated, making
it difficult to identify a single, unified entity.
Alongside the former FSA groups, the SNA also includes factions with more radical Islamist
ideologies. Examples of such groups include the Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza Division,
both of which have been sanctioned by the United States. Additionally, the Sultan Murad Division, which boasts a strong local presence, has been accused of human rights violations, and
tensions simmer between this faction and Turkmen groups also backed by Turkey.
The SNA represents an attempt by Turkey to unify these disparate armed groups under its leadership. However, the success of this endeavor is far from guaranteed. The underlying tensions and competing narratives among the various factions could easily fracture this fragile alliance. Furthermore, the ever-shifting geopolitical landscape in the region adds an additional layer of complexity, further complicating the prospects for a cohesive and sustainable SNA.
Kurdish Groups: Uneasy Allies with Limited Leverage
At the opposite pole of the SNA are the Kurdish People’s Defense Forces. The Kurdish people,
with their aspirations for self-determination, occupy a precarious position in the Syrian conflict.
Kurdish groups, primarily the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Party of the Democratic
Union (PYD), have carved out a semi-autonomous region in North and East Syria. However, their
path forward is fraught with challenges.
Despite their strategic importance, the Kurds lack significant leverage in the broader Syrian
chessboard. Their regional isolation, limited international support beyond the US (which itself is
inconsistent), and dependence on external powers for military aid weakens their bargaining
position.
Internally, Kurdish groups face challenges in unifying the Kurdish population and navigating the
complex ethnic and political landscape of North and East Syria. Balancing their aspirations for
self-governance with the concerns of Arab and Assyrian minorities within their region requires
political delicacy.
Turkmen Militias: A Double-Edged Sword for Turkey
Turkmen militias like the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade present a unique case. Fueled by ethnic
ties to Turkey, they enjoy direct Turkish backing and demonstrate strong motivation. However, their limited support outside Turkmen enclaves and accusations of acting as a Turkish proxy raise
concerns about long-term stability. Their close partnership with Turkey has the potential to
create friction with Arab factions within the SNA.
Militia groups are confronted with a harsh truth: their ability to effectively operate hinges on the
support and resources they receive from external actors or influential local entities. Without such
backing, their leadership, organization, and manpower are rendered ineffective. This reality has
been evident in the struggles of numerous militia groups that have emerged during the Syrian
conflict. They all hold only a fraction of authority and control, engaged in a gruelling and Sisyphean
struggle to gain and lose power on the battlefield.
By manipulating these groups, Turkey has kept them trapped in this cycle and appears to be exploiting
the prolonged Syrian civil war to settle its own ethnic and identity scores. While the Syrian National Army (SNA) largely operates under the influence and authority of Turkish MIT and military forces, it is far more difficult for other more independent militia groups to survive in such an environment without a foreign backer. The Kurds have been fortunate in their ability to engage with local populations. However, the reality is that the Turkish state has also been able to influence local attitudes. In these Kurdish-controlled areas, which were governed in a more democratic, humane, woman-centered, and environmentally friendly manner, the current challenge is that Turkey has not only continued its
ground and drone attacks against them, but even on the eve of the June 2024 local council
elections in Kurdish areas, Erdogan has threatened a full-scale attack against this Kurdish group
again.
Moreover, Turkey is creating chronic tensions in the region through demographic changes,
stirring up Arab tribes, and aligning itself with local Turkmens. When Arab tribal leaders rose up
last year as traditional fronts against Rojava, or the modern and quasi-democratic Kurdish front
in northern and northeastern Syria, it became clear that the Kurds were no longer facing Turkey
only on the military front. Precisely as it have described, the war in Syria has transformed the north and east into a cutthroat marketplace – a bazaar of bullets (Bazaar of Sham)*.
Here, militia groups are the vendors, hawking their skills and allegiances to the highest bidder.
On one side, the Syrian National Army (SNA) is locked in a desperate bidding connection with
Turkey. They dangle the promise of a “friendly” local government in Idlib, hoping to secure
enough Turkish backing to make it a reality. Their rivals, the Kurds, find themselves in a frustrating
stalemate. They yearn for a reliable foreign ally, but the major powers – Russia and America –
are playing their own geopolitical games, leaving the Kurds with scraps of support.
Iran has its own interests in this Bazaar! As the various factions in the Syrian conflict jostle for
power and foreign patronage, Iran has skilfully maneuvered to deepen and broaden its own
sphere of influence, utilizing the shifting alliances and the desperation of some groups for
external support. This has placed Iran in an increasingly antagonistic position with Turkey in the
north and Israel in the south, further complicating the already tangled web of regional rivalries
and power struggles.
This “bazaarification” of the conflict has unforeseen consequences. The focus on identity politics
can exacerbate sectarian divides and hinder efforts towards a lasting peace. Furthermore, the
reliance on external patrons weakens the prospects of a truly Syrian-led solution.
Comprehending the Syrian conflict solely through the lens of military capabilities misses the
bigger picture. This battlefield serves as a stark reminder that wars are waged not only with
weapons but also with narratives, ideologies, and the desire for a sense of belonging. A lasting
solution hinges on understanding these deeper drivers and fostering a more inclusive Syrian
identity that transcends the fragmented loyalties of the current bazaar.
* The Persian term “شام بازار) “bazaar-e shaam), literally meaning “Market of Damascus,” is a historical idiom that has evolved to encompass a broader meaning of chaos, excitement, and pandemonium. The city’s vibrant markets, particularly the famed Souq al-Hamidiyah, were renowned for their diverse offerings and lively atmosphere. However, the sheer volume of trade and the throngs of merchants and shoppers could also lead to scenes of confusion, noise, and occasional scuffles.
Faezeh Ghasemi
