Challenges and opportunities in Iran-Germany relations

Germany’s official relations with Iran go back to the 19th century. Various variables have affected the two countries’ relations. Relations between Iran and Germany have had many ups and downs in the past 44 years, and along with developments such as the assassination of opponents in Europe, the slowness and disconnection of relations, the two countries have witnessed the exchange of numerous delegations and wider economic exchanges.

Germany became Iran’s first trading partner for many years. In the last decade, with the expansion of disagreements, and due to the nuclear issue, convergence has decreased largely.

Relationship’s challenges

Several important issues and challenges influence each other. The end of “Merkelism” and the assumption of the position of German chancellor by Olaf Schulz in December 2021, the uncertainty of the future of the international system, the increase in tensions between global players, the crisis in Ukraine, and the change in the situation in the Middle East and the formation of a coalition government have had an impact on Berlin’s view of Iran.

In recent years, Tehran has pursued the achievement of a multipolar world order, independent foreign policy and the role of a leading regional power, revision of the United Nations, and looking to the East. The unclear fate of the JCPOA is while the nuclear negotiations have been going on for about 20 years, and President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 had far-reaching consequences. Iran has reduced its commitments in several stages and has used the amount of uranium enrichment as the only lever. Germany has also not been able to play an independent role from the US and the incentives to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran have decreased.

In the past year, Germany’s European obligations have caused Berlin to not be able to independently establish strong bilateral relations with Iran. the tightening of visa regulations for official passport holders, the summoning of ambassadors and mutual expulsion of diplomats, mutual accusations, and the expansion of sanctions against Tehran indicate that Relations are at one of the worst periods of the last few decades.

In addition, the relations between the two countries are a reflection of bilateral, regional, and international challenges. Disputes over Iran’s role in Syria and Yemen, Israel, and Iran’s ballistic missiles have continued. Another very important variable is the Ukraine crisis. Many in Germany see Russia as the biggest threat to world peace, Tehran’s refusal to join the Western sanctions against Moscow, Iran’s tendency towards Russia, and Tehran’s accusation of selling drones to Moscow have aggravated the differences. From this point of view, Iranian weapons now directly threaten the security of Europe.[1]

In another dimension, in recent years, the conflict between Germany and Iran has continued in the fields of democracy, rule of law and rights, human rights, democratic institutions, pluralistic government, civil society, rule of law, anti-Islamism and the destruction of terrorist groups.

In the meantime, regarding the protest movement in Iran in 2022, Berlin looks at advancing the protection of universal human rights and women’s rights in Iran.[2] For Iran, it is an internal issue. Therefore, massive demonstrations and support for protests in Germany have widened the gap between the two countries.

From Tehran’s point of view, restrictive measures and growing sanctions against Iran, condemnations, exploitation of human rights as a political tool, closeness to the Iranian opposition and diaspora in Germany, and combined pressure to force Iran to make changes, are contrary to the relations and role of Germany in the revival of the JCPOA.

In another dimension, there is mutual arrest of citizens in situations where both sides do not view it the same.  From Berlin’s point of view, Iran has arrested and charged people with European or dual (Iranian and Western) citizenship. Tehran also does not accept the arrest of people related to it on European soil. In the past year, the dispute over this issue caused Berlin to expel[3] two Iranian diplomats in response to the death sentence for a German-Iranian dual citizen.

In the economic and geo-economic field, although Tehran wants to avoid harming business relations and the economy, the approaches have had negative effects on Iran-Germany economic, tourism, and trade relations.

While Tehran expects Berlin’s support to strengthen Tehran’s position in energy corridors and increase its role in the energy market. Germany’s approach is to suspend the dialogue about energy issues[4] and the priorities of searching for gas sources to replace Russian gas and renewable energies. Also, Germany has been one of Iran’s most important European trading partners in recent years, but trade with Iran has become more limited. The suspension of talks, more sanctions, the German government’s decision to remove trade incentives, etc., have caused the volume of trade between Iran and Germany to reach 695 million euros in the first half of this year with a 25% decrease.

Opportunities to strengthen relationships

The latest agreement between America and Iran is to exchange prisoners, give Iran access to 6 billion dollars of its own money, reduce the pressure of sanctions against Iran, avoid conflict in Syria and Iraq, slow down Iran’s accumulation of 60% enriched uranium and…, which is a kind of important pragmatism and political signal in the two side’s relations.

Germany has had a softer stance towards Iran’s nuclear approach, and through its mediating foreign policy[5], it can still help to reach a better agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and become a bridge between Iran and the West. Berlin in approaches such as mediation, greater participation in the diplomatic solution and greater preparation to deal with the crisis in the Middle East, crisis prevention, conflict resolution, dealing with ISIS, information exchange and anti-terrorism cooperation, supporting freedom of navigation, dealing with insecurity and organized crimes and massive immigration to Europe, etc. can still cooperate with Tehran.

Although Germany is no longer Iran’s first trading partner, there are still large German companies in Iran, and the Iran-Germany Chamber of Commerce and Industry is one of the largest joint chambers of commerce in Iran. The previous bilateral economic basic agreements such as the agreement to encourage and support mutual investment, technology, air transport, road, avoiding double taxation,[6] facilitating the issuance of visas, along with the hope of lifting sanctions and normalizing banking and insurance relations, can solve banking problems and restore past economic relations.

According to German leaders, energy security is important. Therefore, Iran, with abundant oil, gas, and mineral reserves, and cheap energy, can still be useful for Germany in the direction of the stability of the global energy[7] markets and the development of new cooperation with Middle East energy suppliers and programs such as carbon neutrality.

In another dimension, despite ideas such as Germany’s complete lack of reliance on the United States and Europe’s leadership in line with national interests,       regarding Iran’s regional role, cooperation with Iran can lead to opportunities in dealing with the consequences of the climate change, renewable energy, promoting climate and energy diplomacy, and the migration crisis, like in 2015.

More than 120,000 people with Iranian backgrounds in Germany can also serve to strengthen the relations between the two countries. There are opportunities for cooperation in the cross-border interests and threats.

Vision

It seems that the future of Iran-Germany relations has a lot to do with the structure of the international system and the foreign policy and national security strategies of Iran-Germany. But despite the various differences and challenges in relations, Berlin and Tehran need each other. Also, according to the recent clear and transparent dialogue between the foreign ministers of Iran and Germany on a wide range of issues (the first joint dialogue since the Munich Security Conference in February 2022),[8] it is likely to see improvements regarding prisoners with dual German-Iranian citizenships and Better improve relationships.

Referral of Iran’s nuclear case to the United Nations Security Council or the official return of the United States to the JCPOA is almost far from expected. But probably, along with the tacit agreement between Iran and the West to contain the tension without the official return of the United States to the JCPOA, it will prevent the escalation of the crisis. In addition, the creation of a new mechanism similar to the JCPOA will lead to relatively more stable relations between Iran and Germany.


[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/739317/EPRS_BRI(2023)739317_EN.pdf

[2] https://teheran.diplo.de/ir-fa

[3]https://www.voanews.com/a/germany-expels-iranian-diplomats-in-response-to-death-sentence-for-german-citizen-/6973747.html

[4]https://otaghiranonline.ir/news/55132/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AB%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[5]https://www.diberatung.de/fa/%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/

[6] https://berlin.mfa.ir/portal/generalcategoryservices/4991

[7] https://www.partner-atlas.com/land/irak-sicherung/

[8]https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/politik-differenzen-baerbock-telefoniert-mit-irans-aussenminister/29389872.html

Farzad Ramezani Bonesh is an iranian analyst and journalist covering the Middle East and Asia

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.

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