Hezbollah after Nasrallah

Alma Marin Johan

In recent years, Hassan Nasrallah, the charismatic leader of Hezbollah, brought the group closer to Iran than ever before.

No other Arab group was as intimate to Tehran as that one.

There are various narratives surrounding his relationship with the leaders of the Islamic Republic, but all converge on one conclusion: the relationship has been highly strategic and close.

For the Islamic Republic, which has been deprived of modern weaponry for over forty years and facing security concerns following the Iran-Iraq war, proxies have become less a product of anti-Israeli ideology and more a response to the necessity of shifting potential conflicts away from Iran’s borders to protect its vulnerable frontiers.

According to Iran’s defense doctrine, proxies, along with other unconventional military tools, have gradually replaced conventional forces weakened by decades of sanctions. Speedboats have substituted for large naval vessels, missiles for fighter jets, and proxy forces for the traditional army. This strategy aims to end what Iranian policymakers perceive as the country’s “strategic loneliness,” a condition that has shaped Iran’s geopolitical landscape.

For decades, Iran has strived to maximize its security. However, due to a series of misguided policies, particularly in the last decade, Iran’s attempts to enhance its regional influence have paradoxically increased regional tensions and ultimately undermined its own security. Within Iranian think tanks, there’s a persistent view that the more Tehran publicly supports its proxies, the more Tehran intimidates its adversaries. So despite the clear self-inflicted harm, the Islamic Republic persisted in backing its proxies.

In practice, this approach has faced challenges. The internal radicalization of Iran’s policies, the increased influence of the Revolutionary Guard’ commanders in politics, and the over-reliance on proxy forces, due to a loss of internal and external political support, have all contributed to a more ideologically-driven direction in recent years. Additionally, the growing rift between Iran’s political and military leaders, and among its proxies, has further complicated the situation.

These dynamics culminated in the events of October 7, which exposed internal divisions among Iran’s proxies and revealed a lack of accurate assessment of capabilities. Within both the Islamic Republic and its proxy forces, corruption and sycophancy have often replaced realism. Despite many Revolutionary Guard commanders opposing Ismail Haniyeh’s operation in Hamas, internal pressures forced them to publicly praise it.

As a result, Iran found itself drawn into a conflict, despite reluctance from many of its leaders who preferred to avoid direct military engagement.

The October 7 event has transformed many calculations for Iran. It was not only a significant shock for Hezbollah, but also for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was confronted with the reality of Iran’s military limitations.

They realized that the so-called “strategic loneliness” persists, and that proxies have not fully compensated for this isolation. One of the most significant consequences is the decline in Iran’s reliance on Hezbollah. The group has suffered substantial losses, both in terms of military personnel and equipment, and its image has been severely tarnished. Perhaps most importantly for Iran, Hassan Nasrallah has been killed.

With Nasrallah’s absence, the future of Hezbollah, Iran, and its other proxies is shrouded in uncertainty. Nasrallah was both a military strategist and a powerful orator who became a symbol of the resistance front. But now that he is gone, what will happen next?

One likely scenario for Hezbollah post-Nasrallah involves internal divisions. Some factions may favor maintaining close ties with the Islamic Republic, while others may distance themselves. There could also be divisions between those advocating for continued militant activities and those seeking a more political and parliamentary approach. Given the group’s significant loss, it is likely that Hezbollah may struggle to unify its supporters under a single leader or agenda. This could significantly weaken both Hezbollah and Iran’s proxy strategy, as the Islamic Republic may no longer place the same trust in the group.

New leaders who succeed Nasrallah may face skepticism, with some questioning whether they have cooperated with Nasrallah’s enemies to undermine Hezbollah’s previous identity. Such doubts could fuel further divisions and weaken the organization. In such a scenario, might Iranian officials opt to give more direct orders to Hezbollah’s mid-level commanders?

However, just as fragmentation weakens Hezbollah, it could also lead to the emergence of a more radical version of the group. Extremist elements, no longer under the control of central leadership, could form new factions focused on revenge and more aggressive militant actions.

A second, somewhat less likely scenario, is that Hezbollah continues under new leadership, albeit weakened. This would depend on the group’s ability to reach a settlement with Israel and find the space to rebuild before complete disintegration. Such an outcome seems unlikely in the current conflict, but if regional Arab states seek to pull Hezbollah into their sphere of influence, shifting it away from Iranian control, Hezbollah’s trajectory could change. Despite the challenges, Hezbollah still enjoys significant popularity among young Arabs due to its support for Gaza in the recent war.

A third potential scenario is a major internal purge within Hezbollah. However, such an overhaul would require a charismatic leader or a powerful institution capable of carrying it out. While the IRGC once had this capacity, it currently lacks a dominant figure able to lead such an operation abroad. If this internal restructuring were to occur, Hezbollah might be able to recover and re-enter the regional power game, given its long-standing social and political influence in Lebanon.

Several other outcomes are also possible. Hezbollah might struggle to establish effective leadership, potentially operating as a rogue entity within Lebanon, or in the highly unlikely scenario, dissolve entirely. Yet, two critical factors diminish these prospects: first, Hezbollah is rooted in ideology, and ideologies don’t vanish after military setbacks; they adapt. Second, Iran no longer has the capacity to restore Hezbollah to its former strength.

So we expect transformation in Hezbollah. In the end, Hezbollah could experience various transformations, whether through internal fragmentation, changes in its political or military direction, or reorganization. The group may persist in a weakened form, either through splintering or by shifting its ideological identity toward alignment with Arab states.

The translation of all of these circumstances is that Iran must reconsider its reliance on proxy forces. A country’s security and defense strategy cannot be entrusted to those who are driven by the national sentiments and aspirations of another nation. So the future of Iran’s defense policy will depend on the events of the coming months.

As the future of Iran depends on Hezbollah, the future of Hezbollah will depend significantly on the Lebanese people’s own choices and whether they choose to follow Nasrallah’s path or pursue a different course. Ultimately, Lebanon’s willingness to reconcile with Israel may be shaped more by fear of future Israeli attacks than by the legacy of figures like Nasrallah. For the displaced, the priority is returning to their homes, and for Lebanese youth, feelings of abandonment or frustration could lead them to support any entity that offers them security or calls for revenge for their fallen.

Alma Marin Johan is a GSPI fellow, writing under pseudonym, focusing on security issues and non-state actors worldwide

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.