How would Iran’s “friends” Russia and China react in case of an open conflict with Israel

Although China, Russia, and Iran are on the same page in their dissatisfaction with the
current state of the world order and have relatively effective interactions with each other, they
have never sought a military alliance and balance to counter and provoke the West.

At least as much as the Westerners created NATO within the framework of the North Atlantic axis.
There is little likelihood of such an alliance in the near future.

Russia’s history of “friendships”

A closer look at Russia’s history reveals a trend of lack of military support for its allies and
signatories of military agreements following the Cold War.

For instance, in 2010, during the unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Russia was indifferent, despite being bound by the 1994 Collective Security Treaty.

Similarly, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia did not provide effective military assistance to Armenia, despite having a military base in the country.

While there is a long-standing cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia, Foreign Minister
Lavrov has only made generalized statements about security concerns, without offering
concrete solutions.

However, over the past few decades, Russia has taken actions towards Iran that have not
portrayed it in a positive light – from the decade-long delay in providing S-300 systems, to the
repeated assertion of the UAE that Iran “illegally owns three islands”, to supporting the
Zangezur Corridor, and causing a shift in the geopolitics of the Caucasus, which is ultimately
against Iranian national interests.

This kind of Russian behavior was evident again in the leaked audio file of Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in 2021, where he also revealed Russia’s interference during the JCPOA negotiations and their reluctance to ease tensions between Iran and the West.

It can be argued that in the short term, a war between Iran and Israel would benefit Russia,
as it would provide them with the opportunity to intervene and offer military support to Iran,
potentially balancing out the asymmetry between Iran and Israel.

Furthermore, the increase in oil prices, unlike China, would greatly benefit Russia, an oil-exporting nation facing sanctions.

This would, in turn, reduce the importance of Ukraine to the USA, Ukraine’s most important financial and military supporter.

Moreover, given Russia’s significant influence over Iran and the axis of resistance, it is likely that the West will need to compromise or reduce tensions on the issue of Ukraine with Russia to resolve tensions in the
Middle East.

This would also serve as a display of Russia’s soft power, further undermining America’s reputation as the guarantor and primary hope for stability and security in the region. And, in terms of soft power, in general, America, as the guarantor and the first hope of establishing stability and security in the Middle East, by creating a war in this region, its image is distorted in the international scene.

Ultimately, in practice, the traditional conservatism of Russia against Israel, the Jewish lobby in Russian politics, and the population of more than 1.5 million Russian-born Jews in Israel are among the impediments and challenges Moscow faces in supporting Tehran in the Iran-Israel tensions.

Pragmatic and economy focused China

One of China’s concerns has always been ensuring access to raw materials and the energy
market. China’s dependence on Iran mainly is oil imports, which comprise almost 10-15% of
the country’s total oil imports.

China’s industrial machine needs cheap Iranian oil, which is sold to China at huge discount rates. An attack on Iran’s oil facilities takes away China’s opportunity to purchase cheap Iranian oil.

But in general, the instability in the Middle East not only puts the energy sector at risk, but also China’s extensive investments in some countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and even Israel are at stake.

It is worth noting that China does not intend to invest much in Iran, despite having signed a 25-year long-term cooperation agreement. The reasons for this are claimed to be Iran’s non-membership in the FATF and instability.

In recent years, China has invested only $400 million in Iran, which did not meet the Tehran’s expectations. Meanwhile, statistics show that China invested several times more in Israel than in Iran in
2022.

In a possible conflict scenario, China is a non-interventionist in the Middle East, with no
history of colonial rule and never effectively supported either side.

China acted as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia only a few years ago and has more recently been a key player in de-escalating tensions between Fatah and Hamas.

China does not want to tarnish its positive diplomatic image by interfering or supporting either side in a conflict.

Moreover, the cost of supporting Iran and losing Israel, and even some pro-Western Arab governments,
would be much higher than the benefits Iran would bring to China.

The reasons why tensions between Iran and Israel would end at the expense of China, at least in the short term, and which are considered obstacles to effective military support for Iran, include: China, the world’s largest oil importer, would see rising oil prices and slower its industry’s growth; the second reason is that tensions threaten Chinese investments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; instability in Iran, a key Middle Eastern transit route to Europe and the United States, complicates intercontinental trade; and finally, China’s role in a potential conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv is more likely to be that of mediator, rather than intervention or support for either party.

In any case, in the conventional retaliatory operations similar to “True Promise II” and the Israeli response to it, the Chinese and Russian positions will be nothing more than diplomatic rhetoric calling for restraint. Until now, that was the case.

This position is practically neutral and it is more beneficial for Tel Aviv. After all, the Russian ideal is a balanced tension and it will not sacrifice the relations with each of these two countries for the other.

On the contrary, China’s ideal is no tension, at least in the short term. In fact, one can say that if we were in, say, 2034, the strategic distance between China and the United States would be smaller and
China’s occupation of Taiwan was more likely, tensions in the Middle East would have been
favorable for China.

1 https://besacenter.org/will-russia-support-iran-in-the-event-of-its-full-scale-attack-on-israel/

2 https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-comprehensive-treaty-with-iran-will-include-defence-lavrov-says-
2024-10-31/
3 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/10/iran-russia-military-aid?lang=en
4 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/5/what-russia-wants-from-israel-iran-escalation-chaos-good-war-
bad
5 https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-the-ukraine-and-gaza-wars-mean-russia-could-
now-support-a-nuclear-armed-iran/
6 https://www.stimson.org/2024/russia-benefits-from-continued-but-calibrated-iran-israel-hostilities/
7 https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/crown-conversations/cc-22.html
8 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/iran-israel-exchanges-are-test-chinas-influence-gulf
9 https://www.economist.com/china/2024/10/15/does-china-welcome-or-dread-an-iran-israel-war

Hameed Jabery is Graduate of International Relations, University of Tehran

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.