The Gateway SPI Strategic Policies & Ideas
Hameed Jabery
The relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia should not be viewed as a normal case because a look at history indicates considerable fluctuation between the two. This shows the similarities and differences between the foreign policies of these countries. For this reason, regarding Palestine and Gaza, there is much overlap at the strategic level of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and Iran. however, at the tactical level, there are differences between the two countries over the nature of Palestinian rights and how they should be granted.
Saudis consider themselves Muslims rather than Arabs. Therefore, Islam is the most important identity variable at the national level. The country considers itself to be the custodian of the two holy mosques. Subsequently, the nature of Saudi foreign policy, especially towards Iran, contrary to the media image and the view of public opinion, has been based on hegemony and leadership in the Islamic world, rather than being caused by sectarianism and the Shiite-Sunni war. Considering the high degree of sensitivity of the Palestinian issue for the nation as well as the Pan-Islamic foreign policy of the state, Saudi Arabia cannot be indifferent to the Gaza war.
According to Article 11 of the Iranian Constitution, the main purpose of foreign policy is to contribute to establishing a Unified Islamic Ummah- nation-state. Meanwhile, Islamist hardliners in general and right-wing groups and parties in particular, such as Jebhe Paydari or the Resistance Front in Iran, consider America and Israel as the main obstacles, not Saudis. In addition, the central concept of Iran’s revolutionary ideology after 1979 has been to support the oppressed and Muslims, especially Palestinians. Ultimately, at least when it comes to Palestine, Tehran and Riyadh have had a relatively common approach and concern at the strategic level.
However, at the tactical level, there are significant differences between the two countries. Regarding the rights of the Palestinians, while Saudi Arabia and most Islamic and Arab governments emphasize the two-state solution, Iran wants the Palestinians to return to their borders in 1948, not the 1967 borders, and is looking for a referendum in Israel to solve the Palestinian issue.
Another important difference between Tehran and Riyadh concerns the power structures of the West Bank and Gaza. Contrary to Iran’s support for Hamas and to a lesser extent Islamic Jihad, Saudi Arabia supports Mahmoud Abbas’s political roadmap within the framework of the Palestinian Authority due to its tradition of opposing the Muslim Brotherhood’s political Islam and its closeness to Hamas.
While Saudis feel threatened by Hamas in terms of philosophy and political thought, the core of Iranian policy on the Palestinian issue is the militant and resistance groups, and at its top is Hamas.
The result of the war in Gaza is that, by freezing and setting aside differences at the tactical level, the two countries have been able to create common ground, albeit temporarily, in order to put pressure on Israel to halt its war machine and call for a ceasefire. This has brought the two countries together at least temporarily. ” What brings us closer to the solution is a ceasefire, and Israel’s response to decades-long peace efforts”, Said Saudi foreign minister Bin Farhan at the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002 was reiterated in the final resolution of the November Arab-Islamic summit held by Saudi Arabia, Riyadh in the presence of Iran. In another example, as cited by Reuters, not provoking Iran, was mentioned as one of the reasons for Saudi Arabia’s non-participation in the coalition against Yemen in the Red Sea.
On the other hand, The Gaza war has also catalysed the rapprochement of the two countries by marginalizing the Arab-Med Corridor project as a competitor of Iran’s South-North Corridor and, more importantly, the suspension of normalization talks with Israel by Saudi Arabia, which could lead to the isolation of Iran to some extent. Therefore, unlike the March 2023 deal, the rapprochement of the two countries, does not arise from internal and external constraints and challenges but is also the result of common interests and goals.
Despite the temporary rapprochement of the two countries, tactical differences and diverging interests will probably be highlighted, especially in the area of normalization and administration of Gaza, in the post-war world; however, given the practical and functional constraints in the domestic and foreign policy of both countries, and second, in terms of strategic cooperation in supporting the rights of the Palestinians, serious tension is less likely to occur, at least in the form of hostilities, as in recent years.
The post-war relationship of the two is likely to resemble a skate blade, maintaining a balance between convergence at the strategic level and divergence at the tactical level.
Regarding the perspective of the regional order and specifically the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the post-war world, several issues should be considered. As said by defence minister Yoav Gallant: “Israel will take any measures in order to destroy Hamas, but we have no intention to stay permanently in the Gaza Strip” , assuming Israel’s failure to eliminate the military power of Hamas, a big change in the position and approach of the two countries is a bit far-fetched. In the other scenario, if Hamas is removed as a military force and even as a government (here we do not mean Hamas as an ideology), Iran’s position on the Palestinian issue would be significantly weakened; of course, the Saudis will not be too upset.
In other scenarios, if the administration of Gaza is handed over to the Arab forces and the cost of reconstruction is also borne by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran’s influence would decline , marking another point of divergence between the two countries.
The possibility of Palestinian Authority rule over the Gaza Strip is also against Iran’s interests, but in Saudi Arabia’s. Finally, perhaps it can be said that one of the scenarios that may be proposed as a relatively comprehensive and inclusive solution with minimal tension between Riyadh and Tehran is the release of Marwan Al-Barghouti from prison, who is known as the Nelson Mandela of Palestine and is very popular in both the West Bank and Gaza; This depends heavily on the political will of the Israelis and the consensus of all Palestinian groups.
[1] https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/saudi-arabias-balancing-game-palestinian-cause-and-regional-leadership [1] https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/4699066-saudi-fm-what-brings-us-closer-solution-gaza-ceasefire [1] https://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id=39923&t_ref=26755&lan=en [1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/riyadh-reluctant-derail-iran-detente-over-us-red-sea-taskforce-2023-12-20/ [1] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-13/ty-article/.premium/saudi-arabia-freezes-normalization-talks-with-israel-amid-ongoing-war-with-hamas/0000018b-2a0b-d1bc-a58b-6baf83c20000 [1] https://www.voanews.com/a/heavy-israel-hamas-clashes-in-khan-younis/7392641.html [1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-seeks-help-from-arab-states-to-plan-gaza-governance-after-war-25310460 [1] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-palestinian-authority-survive-israels-war-gaza [1] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231104-can-marwan-barghouti-the-palestinian-mandela-bring-peace-to-gazaHameed Jabery is graduate of International Relations, University of Tehran, Iran
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