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Iran’s presence in the Red Sea dates back to the Achaemenid and Sassanid periods.
In the past four decades, Tehran has tried to expand its multidimensional relations with the countries bordering the Red Sea (except Israel) in the fight against terrorism, weapons and military technology, and political and economic dimensions.
After 2016, Riyadh and some Red Sea countries suspended their diplomatic relations with Iran. However, in the past few years, Iran’s approach to the Red Sea has been multidimensional.
Diplomatic and political approach
The Red Sea is located between the Arabian Peninsula and northeastern Africa, the Bab al-Mandab strait, the Indian Ocean, and the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan are the neighbors of the Red Sea.
In the past few years, political and diplomatic relations between Iran and the countries bordering the Red Sea have improved and increased. Tehran has built a part of its foreign policy based on supporting the resistance groups, confronting the dominating countries, increasing access, influencing the Mediterranean region, and supporting a network of allies.
Like Iran, Ansar Allah (the Houthis) has an anti-American and anti-Israeli ideology. They have gained a major advantage over their domestic rivals in Yemen.
With their anti-Israeli approach, oil exports through the Red Sea fell by 50 percent between January and September 2024. The increasing power of the Houthis in the power structure in Yemen has determined Iran’s increased attention to the Red Sea.
Ali Mohammad Rezaei, the new Iranian ambassador to Yemen, went to Sanaa in August 2024. Tehran, opposing Israel’s approach against Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, also denies involvement in fueling the conflict in Yemen.
The extensive improvement in Iran-Saudi relations has also played a significant role in improving and reducing tensions and developing visits and relations with other Red Sea actors(except Israel), such as Jordan.
Apart from the restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia, since 2023, improving relations with Egypt has also been carried out. Pezeshkian’s visit to Cairo, the second visit by an Iranian president to Egypt since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, has been effective in developing relations and visits, cooperation in the geopolitical, security, and political spheres of the region, and increasing trade, tourism, and cultural exchanges.
Since 2018, Ethiopia has become closer to Iran, and Tehran provided weapons to Ethiopia. As a result, the Tigray rebels signed a ceasefire agreement with the central government.
Iran and Djibouti also decided to resume diplomatic relations in the summer of 2023 and agreed to strengthen friendly relations between them in various fields.
The development of relations with Somalia through meetings such as the meeting of foreign ministers in Jeddah in the summer of 2024 has opened a new page in the relations between the two countries.
Attention to improving relations and expanding all-around interactions with Eritrea was evident in the meeting between Massoud Pezeshkian and Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed in the summer of 2024.
In addition, in October 2023, Sudan normalized its relations with Iran. Sudan and Iran developed relations in July 2024 by sending their ambassadors after eight years of no diplomatic relations. Apart from the role of Iranian drones in the conflict in favor of the government, in February 2025, Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araqchi met with his Sudanese counterpart in Tehran, officially supporting the Sudanese government, signing a memorandum of understanding to form a joint political committee, and a visa waiver agreement, moved relations forward. From Tehran’s perspective, strengthening relations with actors such as Sudan in the Red Sea (with an 853-kilometer coastline) can help strengthen the “axis of resistance” and eliminate their relations with Israel.
Geopolitical and military-security approach
Israel is perceived in Tehran as a serious enemy on the eastern coast of the Red Sea. Iran has also always tried to neutralize the hostile actions of its adversaries and reduce American influence in the region by increasing its geopolitical weight in this region.
Iran has repeatedly denied involvement in the Houthi attacks. However, it also considers the Red Sea a field for legitimate struggle with Israel.
The Pezeshkian government make efforts to “strengthen relations with neighbors”, and the idea of creating “a strong region” to pursue policy based on opportunity to create a “balance” in relations with countries, in line with national interests, economic development, and the need for peace and security in the region and the world, and welcomed reducing tensions.
From Tehran’s perspective, a new order and a multipolar world are taking shape, and the Red Sea has gained greater geopolitical and geostrategic value and importance with the presence of regional and transregional actors.
Tehran is considering the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing multilateral cooperation model to reduce Washington’s geopolitical presence in the region. It also considers its presence in the Red Sea to be security-building and has criticized what it has percieved as US efforts to militarize the Red Sea.
In another dimension, Iran’s political and military leaders and elites are considering increasing strategic depth and strengthening and maintaining its presence in international waters such as the Red Sea.
Iran’s drone carriers, Iranian drones and missile capabilities, naval aviation support and helicopter carrying capabilities, missile and drone launch platforms, and Iran’s growing fleet are stronger than ever.
Tehran states that Iran attaches great importance to maritime security and freedom of navigation, ensuring the security of maritime traffic, countering pirate activity, and being prepared to confront threats and conspiracies by official and unofficial actors, and escorting ships in the Red Sea in cooperation with regional countries.
Also, in line with the government’s plan to consolidate authority, deterrence, security and defense, modernize and strengthen military capabilities, it favors the conclusion or activation of security cooperation agreements with regional countries to prevent drug trafficking, crime and control terrorism, and even creating a collective security system in the region, enhancing military relations, exploring opportunities for cooperation in the field of weapons, and a common security system.
Geoeconomics
Another reason for increasing Iranian presence in the Red Sea is the region’s economic and geo-economic opportunities. Africa can be an important partner of Tehran in terms of rich primary resources and consumption market.
Therefore, Iran wants to increase trade with Africa 10 times, “developing strategies for developing economic and trade relations with African countries” and focusing on economic and geoeconomic goals, thus trying to take advantage of the region’s opportunities to increase its national power.
The government’s approach to the region includes important variables such as developing the Makran in the sea-based area, competing and entering international markets, entering global markets, solving interbank and communication problems with the world, improving Iran’s health, cultural and historical tourism capacities, reducing the flood of human migration, paying attention to the green economy, achieving 8% growth, attracting $200 billion annually, resolving imbalances in energy, reduce its dependence on the dollar, diversify its foreign currency portfolio, gas, etc.
The Red Sea can offer important trade routes and influence world economic developments, act as a gateway to international trade and as a “doorway to Africa”, and an alternative route to sanctions for Iran.
The 14th Iranian government has also spoken of its efforts to use Africa as a land of opportunities. To deepen its strategy in Africa, Iran can use the Red Sea location to trade with East Africa and other regions.
Outlook
Iran’s future approach in the Red Sea depends on numerous political, economic, international, and security factors such as US policy in the Middle East, global geopolitical changes, changing patterns of regional interactions, and the tendency towards more pragmatic policies.
Obstacles such as sanctions and reactions from other powers are important. Within the framework of the foreign policy strategy of “neighbors first”, Tehran will try to eliminate pressure from regional countries .
Iran hopes that the gap between Iran and regional countries will narrow, increasing Tehran’s credibility and stopping the process of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations.
It is likely that cooperation centered on Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan in the region, a policy of reducing problems to zero, fully restoring diplomatic relations, and expanding political-economic relations with Red Sea countries other than Israel, will continue to be Tehran’s strategy targets.
Farzad Ramezani Bonesh is an Iranian analyst and journalist covering the Middle East and Asia
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
