Political, geopolitical and security aspects of Iran-Pakistan relations

Farzad Ramezani Bonesh

Following the independence of Pakistan in August 1947, Iran was the first country to recognize the country’s independence. Apart from signing the friendship treaty in May 1950, Iran provided a lot of help in the Indo-Pakistan war (1965) and in the crisis of 1971 AD (independence of Bangladesh).

Following the occurrence of the Islamic revolution in 1979, the two side’s relations entered new phase, and little by little, the variable of terrorism affected the relations.

However, on January 16, Iran carried out attacks against the Jaish-ul-Adl terrorist group in Pakistan’s Balochistan. Two days later, Pakistan claimed that it had attacked the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province.[1]

The tension rose and Islamabad recalled its ambassador from Tehran and forbade the return of the Iranian ambassador. With the efforts and urgent talks of the two countries, the border attacks did not lead to the interruption of diplomatic relations, and then the two side’s diplomats traveled to the other country. The interaction between Iranian and Pakistani officials, their common desire to participate in more dialogue and the lack of provocative rhetoric on both sides led to the reduction of tension and the two countries entered into a new phase of security cooperation.

Recently, Iranian FM Hossein Amirabdollahian said: “We are strongly interested in Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and we consider Pakistan’s security as Iran’s security. Also. after the phone conversations between the two side’s officials, and the emergency meeting of the National Security Committee and members of the Pakistani cabinet, the end of the tension was announced with the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Iran and the return of the ambassadors of the two countries.[2]

Security and anti-terrorist aspects in Pakistan-Iran relations

Having the ability to influence extremism in the southeastern border of Iran, ‘the religious schools of Pakistan’ are considered a threat to Iran’s national security.

In Pakistan, Baloch nationalism has been prevalent since 1948. In Iran, since the 1980s, especially in the last two decades, radical Baloch groups such as Jaish al-Adl (founded in 2012) have been active. Iran is sure that radical groups enjoy foreign support from Israel or the West.

Pakistan also belives that the third countries are involved in helping the Baloch militia organizations. Pakistan claims[3] that some Pakistani separatist groups are based in Iran.

In fact, Iran’s attacks have a serious message about military action against border terrorism, and Tehran expects Pakistan to adhere to preventing the establishment of bases and establishment of armed terrorist groups in its territory.

In the current situation, the two countries are determined to adopt a collective approach[4] based on cooperation to deal with the threat of terrorism by strengthening the cooperation mechanisms between the two countries.

That means, apart from the strengthening of cooperation and the implementation of previous agreements, the appointment of liaison officers between the two countries in the cities of Turbat ” and “Zahedan” [5]and numerous communication channels between the leaders of the two countries and military commanders have been developed. However, due to the problems related to smuggling, illegal immigration, activities of border militias and common concerns in border areas, a new strategy has been considered to establish stability and share information and military operations.

Political and geopolitical aspects of Iran-Pakistan relations

There have been challenges and differences in bilateral relations since the past. Some national and international policies and interests have caused differences of opinion regarding regional and international issues.  Radical sects in Pakistan believe that Pakistan should cut off all its relations with Iran. [6]Washington’s role in Iran’srelations with Islamabad is important, and Pakistan continues to maintain its alliance with the United States.[7]

Pakistan’s priorities in Middle East alliances are not aligned with Iran’s approach. Pakistan’s view and actions in Afghanistan are not aligned with Iran’s interests in Afghanistan. Some people in Pakistan believe that Iran’s view of the Kashmir crisis is not aligned with Pakistan’s, and sometimes it has come closer to India. Also, Islamabad considers the cooperation between Iran and India as a threat. Many in Islamabad believe that India is seeking to encircle Pakistan by deepening ties with Iran.

Pakistan is concerned about India’s presence in Pakistan’s Balochistan and the danger [8]of Iran’s cooperation with India regarding Pakistan.

In addition, any further expansion of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan’s alliance in the South Caucasus against Iran’s approach and interests can create conflicts between Tehran and Islamabad.

Also, anti-shi’ism, Iranophobia, the presence of religious extremists near Iran’s borders, and the risk of increasing interference of third countries in destabilizing borders with Iran can threaten relations.

However, there are vast opportunities in Iran-Pakistan relations. Pakistan is one of the countries where Iran’s influence is seen positively. Actually, the national anthem of Pakistan is in Persian language,[9] and the Shia community in Pakistan is about 15 to 20 percent of the population.

Non-territorial differences and full respect for each other’s sovereignty [10]and territorial integrity are very important.

The Iranian president still welcomes the improvement of the level of interactions with Pakistan in the foreign policy under the policy of strengthening relations[11] with neighbors. Also, after Raisi’s congratulatory message to the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Pakistani PM said that Islamabad is waiting for the early visit of Raisi to Pakistan.[12]

Strengthening joint military and training exercises,[13] combating terrorism and managing natural disasters, building military systems and equipment, common interests in maintaining maritime security and protecting regional shipping lines are still considered by both sides.

Even before the Iran’s airstrikes, the two countries held joint naval maneuvers near[14] the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. 

With the new state of relations between Tehran and Riyadh, Pakistan has been placed in a better balance of close relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Multilateral opportunities for Tehran-Islamabad geopolitical cooperation in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and North-South Corridor are still available. Both Iran and Pakistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Pakistan has submitted its formal request to join BRICS. In the meantime, Pakistan can benefit from Tehran’s support in joining BRICS. China has close relations with Pakistan and Iran and is in a good position to mediate.

Vision

With the meetings of the heads of government of Iran and Pakistan at the border point and later in New York, the mutual visit of military and security officials, the signing of the five-year strategic business cooperation plan in 2023, [15]specialized meetings, the trip of senior officials and related officials, etc., the year of 2023 in relations was promising.

Raisi said in the spring of 2023: “The two countries see the border as an opportunity and not a threat.”[16] However, recent border incidents are unprecedented in the history of seventy-seven years. Apart from the extradition of criminals, [17]Iran and Pakistan can prevent the possible escalation of border tensions with a long-term solution to the issue of border instability.

Iran-Pakistan relations with a common border of 960 kilometers[18] have enjoyed continuity. Despite some considerations, obstacles and limitations, common interests and privileges resulting from convergence and cooperation can manage border or terrorist challenges.

New achievements in 2023-24, the future formation of high-level consultations at the level of the foreign ministers of the two countries on an alternate and regular basis with the aim of monitoring the progress in cooperation between the two countries and the upcoming visit of [19]Ebrahim Raisi to Pakistan can also develop the common perspective of relations.


[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/17/pakistan-says-two-children-killed-in-completely-unacceptable-iran-attack

[2]https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6001684/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[3]http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/2024329/%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[4]https://farsnews.ir/news/14021109000350/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF

[5]https://farsnews.ir/news/14021109000350/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF

[6] https://journals.iau.ir/article_528563_ad12d2cc6f37d00dd7549a689eee3a14.pdf

[7] https://www.tbsnews.net/analysis/friend-foe-what-caused-iran-pakistan-conflict-776922

[8] https://www.etilaatroz.com/36347/a-raw-row-did-pakistan-accuse-iran-of-abetting-indian-espionage/

[9] https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/world/asia-pacific/40034796

[10] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/20/low-trust-relation-what-next-for-pakistan-iran-after-tit-for-tat-raids

[11]https://farsi.iranpress.com/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[12]https://www.irna.ir/page/search.xhtml?q=%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86+%D9%88+%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86&a=0&alltp=true&allpl=true&pi=6&allsr=true&pageSize=20&allty=true

[13]https://www.irna.ir/news/85056247/%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B1

[14] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/iran-pakistan-tensions-why-further-escalation-unlikely

[15]https://www.irna.ir/news/85337307/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DB%B2%DB%B0%DB%B2%DB%B3-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%82-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87

[16] https://www.president.ir/fa/144057

[17]https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6001684/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86

[18] https://www.iess.ir/fa/report/3425/

[19]https://farsnews.ir/news/14021109000350/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.

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