The Gateway SPI Strategic Policies & Ideas
Faezeh Ghasemi
The unfolding battle for Syria’s future marks a pivotal part in the nation’s tumultuous history. For over a decade, Syria has endured one of the region’s most oppressive dictatorships and a devastating civil war. Today, while glimpses of hope appear on the horizon, the road to recovery remains fraught with complexity.
The power struggle for Syria continues, evolving from a triangular contest among Iran, Russia, and Turkey to a duel between Turkey and Israel. Among these players, Turkey has emerged as the most assertive force, leveraging its regional priorities. Once oriented towards European integration, Turkey has recalibrated its strategy, turning its focus to the Middle East with a more nuanced and assertive approach better aligned with the region’s volatile political landscape.
Turkey’s growing regional influence extends beyond Syria to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. This strategic maneuvering—including maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan post-Taliban takeover—has solidified Ankara’s role as a key power broker. This expanded influence is the formation of a “Turkic-Ikhwanist Crescent,” countering the “Iranian-Shiite Crescent.”
While Iran’s influence was military in nature and reliant on the strategies of a single individual, whose absence significantly weakened the entire axis, Turkey’s influence is rooted in more enduring economic and demographic dynamics. It is based on shifts in linguistic matters, population movements, and the strengthening of the economic foundations of its areas of influence.
In Syria, however, the dynamics are more intricate than others. While Turkey’s influence initially seemed confined to Idlib and northern regions, recent developments have enabled Ankara to extend its reach further south and west, potentially dragging Turkey into a quagmire of instability and chaos.
Naturally, Turkey’s ambitions face formidable challenges. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) represent a resilient adversary and a rare example of social democracy in a turbulent region. Drawing on years of military and ideological resilience, the SDF continues to resist. Turkey’s longstanding conflicts with Kurdish forces, both domestically and in neighboring territories, highlight the enduring difficulty of achieving a decisive victory.
Turkey’s campaign against the SDF might weaken the group, but it also raises alarms about the resurgence of ISIS in Syria’s terror landscape. According to data provided by CENTCOM (United States Central Command), ISIS carried out nearly twice as many attacks in the early months of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. This surge underscores ISIS’s intent to exploit instability and escalate terror activities. The group may also attempt to recruit disillusioned hardliners from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), particularly those frustrated by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s relatively moderate stance.
The situation becomes even more intricate when considering the competitive dynamics between al-Qaeda and ISIS and their influence over various militias during Syria’s 13-year conflict. While ISIS cells and leaders remain active in Syria, it is highly unlikely that al-Qaeda would abandon such a strategic theater. Instead, al-Qaeda is likely pursuing its agenda through alternative means.
In this context, pressing questions arise: Is al-Qaeda Central, under Saif al-Adl’s leadership—whose current dealings with certain non-Sunni states remain ambiguous—secretly collaborating with HTS? Or is al-Qaeda backing another faction in Syria? These questions resist definitive answers, reflecting the opaque and fragmented nature of Syria’s conflict.
Moreover, Syria’s internal complexity cannot be ignored. A mosaic of ethnicities and sects, the country’s fragile unity is further strained by the competing ambitions of regional and international actors. The Alawites, who have held power for over five decades, face increasing pressure to relinquish control—raising doubts about how easily they will step down. Meanwhile, concerns grow regarding whether secular Kurdish factions will align with the Brotherhood, potentially reshaping the country’s political landscape. In addition, the fate of Syria’s various political and military groups remains uncertain, as questions arise about how and when these factions will lay down their arms amidst the ongoing conflict.
The rise of Ahmad al-Shara, known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, and his attempts to rebrand HTS as a moderate force add another layer of uncertainty. The United States’ cautious engagement with Jolani raises concerns about the long-term implications of legitimizing such actors, especially given HTS’s historical alignment with extremist ideologies.
The parallels with Afghanistan are instructive. HTS’s public celebration of the Taliban’s return to power and its suggestion that their ascent could serve as a model for Syria underscores the risks of empowering ideologically driven militias. In fact, both the Taliban and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham were among the first groups to send congratulatory messages for each other’s victories. When the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, al-Jolani was one of the first to offer his congratulations, and social media outlets close to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham had praised the Taliban’s model in Afghanistan as highly positive. While Syria’s secular traditions and intellectual legacy distinguish it from Afghanistan, even a slightly “modernized” version of extremism could jeopardize the nation’s fragile recovery.
Economically, Syria teeters on the brink of potential growth, contingent on achieving relative stability. The prospect of reconstruction offers opportunities for regional and international stakeholders to contribute to and benefit from the rebuilding process. Both Turkey, Arab countries, and even some Western governments are likely to take on parts of Syria’s economic reconstruction in an effort to end the deep crisis that has unfolded in the country.
If, according to economists, Syria aims to rebuild the country to the pre-war level of 2011 within the next decade, it will require not only stability but also a resolution to the issue of oil and gas in Deir ez-Zor, which is currently controlled by the SDF. It is crucial for the new government in Syria to address this issue through negotiation, similar to the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, or through a more challenging route, such as engaging in combat with the SDF to eliminate their control. The best scenario, requires Syria to carefully navigate its transition from dictatorship to democracy, integrating diverse armed factions into a unified national military and determining whether to adopt a centralized or federal governance model.
Given the regional rivalries, suspicions towards HTS, the presence of extremist groups, and economic challenges in Syria, Syria’s path remains vague, teetering between cautious optimism and the grim realities of potential conflict between different militias, authoritarianism of enlightened despotism, and resurgent extremism. The ultimate trajectory of this country—whether centralized, federal, or fragmented—and the form of its government will inevitably impact the entire region and its power structures, the fate of which will be shaped by the new realities emerging in Syria.
Syria’s future remains delicately poised between the shadow of extremist resurgence and the hope for a more stable and inclusive political order. The data on ISIS’s activities in 2024 underscore the pressing need for a coordinated international effort to counter extremism while addressing the underlying socio-political and economic vulnerabilities that fuel its resurgence. This requires military measures and a commitment to fostering political reconciliation, rebuilding infrastructure, and empowering local communities.
Without such a comprehensive approach, the region risks reliving cycles of violence and instability. As Syria navigates this complex path, the international community must remain engaged, ensuring that the country does not become a breeding ground for renewed extremism but instead emerges as a model for post-conflict recovery in the Middle East—because Syria can either serve as a beacon of hope for many in the region striving to transition from dictatorship to democracy, or conversely, as a source of despair, discouraging revolutionary movements from pursuing democratic transformation.
Faezeh Ghasemi is an expert in International Relations and MENA Studies & Public policies
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
