Tears and Smiles in Iran After the Fall of Bashar Assad

Amir Maghdoor Mashhood

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad marks a significant and impactful event for Iran. On one hand, grief and regret can be observed among the leaders of the Islamic Republic, as they have lost their most critical regional ally. On the other hand, this event has sparked a wave of joy and optimism among the Iranian people, as the weakening of a religious regime in the region amplifies hope for the eventual downfall of the Islamic government in Iran.

In a situation where the Islamic regime faces the dual challenges of losing its proxy forces and strategic ally while confronting a more determined population, the question arises: what pivotal changes await Iran after the fall of Assad’s government?

In this article, I aim to explore key influential factors and, based on past experiences with the Islamic Republic, demonstrate how the regime seeks to create opportunities for rebuilding its proxy forces while ensuring conditions to suppress domestic dissent without foreign interference.

The Deterrent Power of the Islamic Republic

The Islamic Republic has always emphasized two key components as the pillars of its deterrence strategy:

  1. The mass production of long-range and mid-range missiles, as well as military drones.
  2. The establishment and strengthening of proxy forces in the region capable of inflicting serious harm on adversaries.

However, after October 7, 2023, both components suffered significant setbacks. Israel, through long-term planning and learning from its 33-day war with Hezbollah in 2006, managed to almost completely dismantle the Islamic Republic’s proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, the destruction of over 90% of the launched missiles and drones before reaching their targets revealed that the supposed deterrent capability of these weapons was nothing but an illusion.

After the inefficacy of its missile power became evident, the Islamic Republic promptly shifted to its diplomatic tactics.

Code Name: Reform

After the collapse of its missile deterrence power, the regime’s decision-makers realized the urgent need to pave the way for diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, following the helicopter crash involving Ebrahim Raisi, a staged election was held to present an individual with a reformist facade as the new president.

Using the term “reform” as a code name for the Islamic Republic’s engagement with Western powers has previously saved the regime from crises on two occasions. The first instance was during the collapse of the Berlin Wall when Mohammad Khatami was introduced as a reformist president. The second was during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, which led to the JCPOA agreement and eased severe economic sanctions.

Nuclear Enrichment: A Tool for Negotiation

For over two decades, the issue of nuclear enrichment has compelled global powers to sit at the negotiating table with the Islamic Republic. The true value of this issue for the regime lies in its perpetual state of suspension and unresolved status. From the outset, the regime has never intended to fully resolve the nuclear dossier.

In modern history, no government has managed to engage the P5+1 powers in prolonged negotiations for years. This situation has provided the Islamic Republic with the dual benefits of mitigating international risks while reaping significant economic rewards for its ruling oligarchy.

Potential Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy

The return of Donald Trump to power could pose numerous challenges for the Islamic Republic. The first term of Trump’s presidency was a bitter experience for the regime, marked by maximum economic pressure and the elimination of Qassem Soleimani, one of the regime’s key operatives in the Middle East.

However, the rift between the European Union and the Trump administration at that time prevented the complete collapse of the JCPOA and the activation of the snapback mechanism. This precedent suggests that the regime might once again exploit such a divide to mitigate external pressures.

Israel and the New Middle East

Following the October 7, 2023, attack, Israel, under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, launched extensive operations against the military front known as the “Axis of Resistance,” which Israel refers to as the “octopus.” The head of this octopus is in Tehran, with its tentacles stretching from Yemen to Lebanon.

Nearly everyone in Iran has come to believe that Israel, after severing the tentacles of this octopus, will eventually target the Iranian regime itself. The destruction of Iran’s defense systems during the Israeli airstrikes on October 26, 2024, has further reinforced this possibility.

Europe: The Land of Negotiation Enthusiasts

For many years, Iranians have viewed Europe as a collection of figures seen in the media solely for negotiating various issues—sometimes represented by the EU’s foreign affairs officials, and other times by coordinators or similar roles. Europe’s insatiable appetite for negotiation largely stems from the structure of the European Union itself. This entity is primarily equipped with political and diplomatic tools, lacking coercive governance mechanisms like a military force.

Naturally, the EU is bound to rely on its existing tools and capacities to address emerging challenges. This structural limitation also influences the foreign policy decisions of individual European countries, prompting them to align their strategies with the Union’s collective approach. Such a setup has created a reliable opportunity for others to assume that Europe’s response to threats will rarely extend beyond diplomatic negotiations.

It’s Showtime

For the Islamic Republic, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria functioned like a router—a kind of hub for distributing military and financial resources, facilitating the connection between the religious regime in Iran and its proxy forces. After the collapse of its deterrent capabilities, the regime had pinned its hopes on Assad’s survival to rebuild its proxies. However, Assad’s sudden downfall has created significant challenges for the Iranian regime.

But that’s not the whole story. The Iranian people’s dissatisfaction with the religious government has reached unprecedented levels in recent decades. The regime’s inefficiency in delivering public services, its political and economic monopolies, catastrophic levels of corruption, and suppression of basic civil rights—particularly targeting women and the educated classes—have fueled widespread public hatred toward the Islamic regime.

In the meantime, Israel speaks of a “new Middle East” and frequently vows to target the “head of the octopus.” This coincides with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and the peak of social discontent in Iran.

Under these circumstances, the clerics urgently need time to restore and reorganize their proxy forces and suppress domestic unrest. Their best option? Reignite the issue of nuclear enrichment to trigger a new round of prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

The Islamic regime is well aware of how averse European countries are to military confrontations, preferring diplomatic solutions instead. Recent escalations in uranium enrichment are less about technical or military goals and more about provoking the European Troika into resuming nuclear talks. The regime has learned from experience that the rift between Europe and Donald Trump is a critical factor in shaping international dynamics. The more motivated European governments are to negotiate, the more effectively they can act as a barrier against potential military actions from Israel and the U.S.

This strategy was previously set in motion with the election of Massoud Pezeshkian, who appeared as a reformist figure. Europe’s eagerness to negotiate not only curbs Israel and Trump but also ensures European silence and indifference toward the regime’s suppression and killing of Iranian citizens.

The Islamic Republic knows it will inevitably face a new wave of public protests. Its response to the Iranian people is clear: suppression and mass killings. For this, the regime needs international silence, which nuclear negotiations conveniently provide. Any objection to the regime’s crackdowns will likely be countered with threats to leave the negotiation table under the pretext of interference in internal affairs—something Europe is keen to avoid. Europe’s love for negotiations compels it to turn a blind eye to the atrocities against the Iranian people.

Recently, Ali Khamenei emphasized two points in his speech: reorganizing Syrian youth to combat new circumstances (rebuilding proxy forces) and crushing domestic opposition within Iran. The first requires time, and the second relies on silence and indifference—both facilitated by initiating another round of protracted, drawn-out negotiations.

The Final Word

Despite its outwardly barbaric and dogmatic religious appearance, the Islamic Republic possesses a strong survival instinct. It knows how to navigate various arenas to secure its continuity and financial gains. Simultaneously suppressing the Iranian people and engaging in protracted negotiations with the West represents the regime’s primary strategy for the coming days.

Wasting time and reaping economic benefits to rebuild its proxies, while staving off interference in its domestic suppression and killings, are the religious regime’s main goals in these negotiations.

If the clerical regime manages to weather this period, it will have overcome one of the most significant challenges in its history. Achieving this depends on prolonging the nuclear talks long enough—possibly even outlasting the tenures of Trump and Netanyahu.

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.

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