The Iranian Opposition after the Fall of Assad

Hameed Jabery

Like some other countries in the Middle East, Iran has always been involved in conflict with internal opposition groups, both in the Pahlavi period and under the current Islamic Republic. Although such disputes have had many ups and downs, in general, the trend has been such that no ethnic or minority group has not organized an opposition group to the Islamic Republic.

Major minorities each have their regional armed groups. Meanwhile, the People’s Mojahedin Organization, which does not claim to be centered on a particular ethnicity, is an exception.

Many opposition armed groups are active against Iran, but few have a record and operational capability. Furthermore, the general trend of armed struggle against the establishment is decreasing. Whether it is from the side of the Kurdish groups and PJAK, the limitations of the European countries on Al-Ahwaziyya, and ultimately the avoidance of the People’s Mojahedin Organization from violence, all indicate the reduction of the possibility of such battles and ultimately civil war or regime change.

On the other hand, in the area of foreign policy, the successive defeats of the resistance axis, including Hamas and Hezbollah, and especially the overthrow of Assad, have left the system in its worst and weakest stage, both militarily and psychologically.

Ayatollah Khamenei once described Syria as a “pillar of the resistance axis.” Meanwhile, the United States and Israel themselves have somewhat upset the Islamic Republic by threatening to attack Iran’s nuclear
facilities even if they do not carry out their threats. Moreover, we are witnessing the return of Trump, who, with the assassination of Soleimani and the maximum pressure campaign during his first term, has shown one of the most hostile America towards Iran.

In this regard, new hopes are emerging for the Iranian opposition.

Saeed Qassemi-nejad, close to Reza Pahlavi who seeks to restore the monarchy in Iran, says:
“The fall of Assad has caused a great shock to the authorities of the Islamic Republic and
weakened the morale of its supporters.”1

Reza Alijani, another Paris-based dissident, hopes to repeat the scenario of Assad’s fall for Khamenei by highlighting the similarities and closeness of the Assad regime to Iran. 2

Parpanchi, an expert who has worked for years in TV channels critical of the Islamic Republic, optimistically sees Assad’s fall as a factor in strengthening protest movements in Iran and increasing public discontent. 3

Saeed Bashirtash, head of the Central Council of the Aban 7th Front, also expresses hope for reforms in Iran after Assad’s fall. 4

Ramesh Sepehrad, spokeswoman for the Organization of Iranian Council in the US and close to the People’s Mojahedin Organization, supports the revival of the Maximum Pressure campaign by the new US administration and even beyond, saying: “The experience of Assad’s fall showed that the opposition should be on the streets.”

The impact of failures of the resistance axis on the state’s view of the opposition and reforms must be understood through two arguments. First is the government’s record in dealing with such situations and its decision-making structure. The ideology that the Leadership of the Islamic Republic has repeatedly stated is that “whether we are killed or not, we are victorious,” 2 which is called so there is no breaking point defined here. Ayatollah Khomeini also has a famous saying: “Obligations, not results bind us.”

In any case, as far as the decision-making structure is concerned, it should be said that
although under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, we witnessed a decentralized structure
of power, during Khamenei’s time he plays a major role and acts as a trump card indeed.

An example of this is when, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini, with a realistic
understanding of Iran’s power, decided to end the war and accept Resolution 598, because
there were centers of power that gave him a realistic picture of the war without worrying about
their position.

Therefore, we did not witness elites who sought the approval of the leader at any cost to enhance their position, and opposing the leader, i.e. Khomeini, did not threaten their position. But with the changes made to the constitution after Ayatollah Khomeini and the Velayat-e-Faqih (the Supreme Leader) being transformed from relative to absolute power, power is concentrated in the leader. Hereinafter, the elites can no longer easily oppose him, nor can present a picture of the existing realities that are unpleasant to the leader; of course, the selection system of the Islamic Republic reproduces such a situation, since the Islamic Republic’s elites are selected based on ideology, not on merit.

Subsequently, it must be said that in such a situation, the slightest opposition and criticism are perceived by the supporters of the system as disrespect for the leader. Therefore, considering the two aforementioned models, the likelihood of the existing Iranian regime accepting the failure of its foreign policy and implementing reforms is extremely low.

With a realistic look at the current state of power in Iran, some propositions can also be
made.

Unlike in some countries, the Iranian opposition does not have a strong organization, unity, and a clear strategy, and most importantly, a powerful all-encompassing leadership. 5

Although Iranian regional policy has failed to some extent over the past year, the establishment
has supporters who show no strong signs of lack or even a decline in their support for the
regime, at least for the near future.

On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the failures of foreign policy will not force the regime to focus on domestic policy, prioritize security issues, and exercise greater control over the opposition due to fear of regime change. In fact, contrary to the expectations of the opposition, weakening the axis of resistance may backfire and increase pressure on the opposition. Therefore, although there has been relatively high optimism and hope for the Iranian opposition after the fall of Assad, the main difference
between the regime in Iran and Assad is supporters of the Iranian establishment.

In conclusion, it must be said that without military intervention from the West, primarily the United States,
regime change is virtually impossible.

Unlike the countries that have hostile relations with Iran, such as the USA and Israel, which are very powerful, the domestic enemies of Iran are not as powerful as the typical opposition in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic system is very lucky to face a not-so-strong opposition. None of the opposition groups have a specific alternative to put pressure on the Islamic Republic. 3

1 https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c3we8qy9z5wo
2 https://www.radiofarda.com/a/the-first-paragraph—developments-in-syria—alikhamenei/33237678.html
3 https://p.dw.com/p/4nxCK
4 https://ara.tv/n2ye8
5 https://kurdane.com/?p=77958

Hameed Jabery is an expert on MENA and Graduate of International Relations, University of Tehran

GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.