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The Syrian Arab Spring episode, which later developed into a civil war, has truly triggered a revolutionary moment in Turkish foreign policy. As an unprecedented move, Turkey officially pursued the policy of regime change in that neighboring country. Next, Turkey-supported militia groups fought with the Asad regime. However, when the Kurdish groups created various autonomous cantons in Northern Syria, the Turkish strategy and priorities changed completely. Ankara redefined as its top priority the destruction of the nascent Kurdish political administrative structures in Northern Syria.
In 2016, the Turkish army conducted the Euphrates Shield. That was followed by three other major operations, one each in 2018, 2019 and 2020.
| Year | Name |
| 2016 | Euphrates Shield |
| 2018 | Olive Branch |
| 2019 | Peace Spring |
| 2020 | Spring Shield |
Turkish military operations in Syria
More importantly, the military operations were not limited to achieving various military goals. Rather, in those military operations, Turkey created an interconnected administrative region in Northern Syria. Pragmatically, this meant the incorporation of a large Syrian territory into the Turkish administrative system. To put it differently: The Turkish administrative system was expanded to incorporate those Syrian territories. As of today, Turkey rules approximately 5 per cent of Syrian territory, which is nearly ten times larger than the Golan Heights under Israeli occupation.
By referencing 51st Article of the UN Charter, Turkey legitimized the Turkish rule of Syrian territories in the name of fighting terrorism.[1] Meanwhile, Syria sees the Turkish rule of its territories as an occupation, and as a source of terrorism.[2] For example, Syrian President Bashar Assad described the Turkish military presence as an illegal occupation.[3] When it comes to the standing of other regional states, the scene is quite complex. Russia, normally supposed to be critical of the Turkish act of occupation, has become silent on this event of Turkish revisionism in Northern Syria, particularly since beginning of the Ukrainian War. Russia does not want the Syrian dimension to put its relations with Turkey at risk. This is particularly critical since the beginning of the Ukrainian War. When it comes to Iran, Tehran is unhappy with the Turkish presence in Northern Syria. Tehran has been against the Turkish military operations in Syria since their beginning.[4] Recently, Iran proposed that Turkey withdrawal its soldiers from Syria in exchange for an Iranian guarantee to protect Turkish borders from all terrorist threats that might stem from there.[5] Iran, seeing the survival of the Asad regime as a top security priority, is naturally worried by Turkey’s deepening presence in Syria.
Turning back to the Turkish strategy in Syria: Ankara has completely connected the Syrian regions it rules to the Turkish education, health, economy, postal and electricity systems. In what is increasingly looking like a strategy of “Gazafication,”[6] Turkey effectively rules a large Syrian territory where millions of people live. In these “semi-autonomous Turkish protectorates,”[7] daily life and all relevant official procedures (including the activities of the judiciary) are carried out in a system that is directly governed or supervised by Turkish authorities. According to Turkish official data, the number of students in the Turkish-administrated school system, in the Euphrates Shield Administrative Field alone, was 156,324 in 2018.[8] Those educational activities are financed by the Turkish Ministry of Education.[9]
The Turkish strategy in Syria includes other, more controversial, activities, such as a settlement policy in which the local population balance is pushed into a new status quo of increased pro-Turkish attitudes. This demographic engineering has the main task of weaking the Kurdish population in the region.[10] At the very least, it is clear that Turkey’s strategy is to create an “ethnic belt” that contains a strong YPG/PYD presence at its Syrian border. This policy is observed in various tactics, such as in the unequal political representation at the local councils level, and in the demographic engineering efforts, particularly the settling of Arabs and Turkmens.[11]
As a part of this strategy, Turkey has changed the streets names in this area. This cannot but be meant to symbolize not only the purpose of the afore-listed activities, but also to declare their permanency. For example, the main Seray Square in Afrin is now Erdogan Square.[12] Various towns’ and villages’ names are also substituted by Turkish or Arabic names.[13] In another symbolic development, Turkey transformed the house, in which Atatürk is believed to have stayed for one night during the 1st World war, into an Atatürk museum.[14]
The political rationale behind Turkey’s ambitious Syrian policy is revisionism. The Turkish political elite believe that the new status quo requires Turkey to secure its interests beyond Turkish borders. Representing this revisionist outlook, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that if Turkey does not make war in Idlib, Rasulayn, and in other Syrian cities, the Turks might face war in their cities like Hatay, Şırnak and Gaziantep in Southeastern Turkey to protect those provinces.[15] This revisionist framework, designed by Erdoğan, is repeated verbatim by pro-government think-tanks. A few samples of this follow:
In an article published by the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) Ömer Bahram Özdemir, commenting on Turkey’s Olive Branch operation, summarized what Turkish strategy in Syria should be: “Fortify and expand.”[16] Oytun Orhan, a senior analyst at ORSAM, wrote that Turkey’s purpose in the Euphrates Shield operation was to establish a safety zone of 30 km in depth.[17] In a report on the Peace Spring Operation, Orhan repeats the Turkish thesis of the need for a large control area in Northern Syria.[18] According to Can Acun, an analyst at SETA (Foundation for Political, Social and Economic Research), Turkey should establish a safety zone in Northern Syria with a depth of 30 km. Acun sees this as the best long term policy that will help Turkey.[19] Commenting on Peace Spring Operation, Murat Yeşiltaş, another SETA analyst, argues that the unification of Syria will take time, and that requires Turkey to implement complex strategies there.
As the comments above imply, the underlying main argumentation is that Turkey’s response to the various threats (from the Western powers, the PKK, ISIS, and the Syrian regime) can be stopped only by taking control of various regions in Northern Syria.[20] In short, this is a new security doctrine that operates on a revisionist perspective. Recently, the condition set by Syrian President Bashar Assad for a meeting with the Turkish President was the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan found that condition “unacceptable.”[21] As Erdoğan clarified: “We will stay until we are done.”[22]
Unless the international system intervenes, it is realistic to expect that Turkey is likely to stay in Northern Syria. This means also that Ankara will continue the policy of deepening its rule by consolidating its economic, educational and administrative network there. It is clear, therefore, that no matter whether Turkey stays in Syria or leaves, Ankara intends in the meanwhile to structurally transform a part of Syria. In practice, this is to say that Northern Syria is intended to become a “Turkish-friendly” region.
[1] “Fırat Kalkanı Harekatı,” https://www.msb.gov.tr/FiratKalkani. Also see: “Erdogan open to meeting al-Assad but not to withdrawal from Syria,” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/17/erdogan-open-to-meeting-al-assad-but-not-to-withdrawal-from-syria July 17, 2023.
[2] “Syrian foreign minister: No normal ties with Turkey without end to occupation,” https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-foreign-minister-no-normal-ties-with-turkey-without-end-occupation-2023-01-14/ January 14, 2023.
[3] “Erdogan open to meeting al-Assad but not to withdrawal from Syria,” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/17/erdogan-open-to-meeting-al-assad-but-not-to-withdrawal-from-syria July 17, 2023.
[4] https://tr.euronews.com/2022/07/02/iran-disisleri-bakani-abdullahiyan-turkiyenin-suriyenin-kuzeyinde-askeri-operasyonuna-kars 2 July 2022.
[5] https://tr.euronews.com/2023/09/18/irandan-turkiyeye-suriyedeki-askerleri-bizim-garantorlugumuzde-cekin 18 September 2023.
[6] Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “A New Ghaza: Turkey’s Border Policy in Northern Syria,” ECFR Policy Brief, 22 May 2020, 1.
[7] Engin Yüksel and Erwin van Veen, “Turkey in northwestern Syria: Rebuilding empire at the margins,” CRU Policy Brief June 2019, 8.
[8] İpek Coşkun, Suriye’de Eğitimin Geleceği ve Fırat Kalkanı Bölgesinde Eğitim Faaliyetleri Ankara: SETA, 2018, 28.
[9] Ibid., 32.
[10] Sinem Adar, “Repatriation to Turkey’s “safe zone” in Northeast Syria: Ankara’s goals and European concerns”, SWP Comment, No. 1/2020, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 3.
[11] Ibid., 3-4.
[12] “Turkish-backed groups rename Afrin’s main square after Erdogan,” https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/16898-Turkish-backed-groups-rename-Afrin’s-main-square-after-Erdogan August 8, 2018.
[13] Rauf Baker, “When will Turkey Annex Northern Syria?” Middle East Quarterly Fall 2021, 8.
[14] “Afrin’e Atatürk müzesi,” Akşam, https://www.aksam.com.tr/kultur-sanat/afrine-ataturk-muzesi/haber-1178101 June 1, 2021.
[15] https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-karsimizdaki-senaryonun-asil-hedefi-suriye-degil-turkiyedir-suriyede-istediklerini-alanlar-namlulari-hemen-turkiyeye-cevirecektir
[16] Ömer Behram Özdemir, “Kuzey Suriye’de Türkiye Varlığı: Tahkim et ve Genişle,” ORSAM Dosya, (June, 2018), 19-21.
[17] Oytun Orhan, “Fırat Kalkanı,” Ortadoğu Analiz, 8(77), 2016, 12.
[18] Oytun Orhan, “Barış Pınarı Harekatı: Kim Ne Kazandı?” https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/baris-pinari-harekati-kim-ne-kazandi/ October 23, 2019.
[19] “Hedef Suriye’nin Kuzeyinde Otuz İki km Derinlikte Bir Güvenli Bölge,” https://www.setav.org/hedef-suriyenin-kuzeyinde-otuz-iki-km-derinlikte-bir-guvenli-bolge/ May 26, 2022.
[20] Murat Yeşiltaş, “Barış Pınarı Harekatı,” https://www.setav.org/baris-pinari-harekati-kazanimlar-riskler-ve-firsatlar/ October 27, 2019.
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Erdoğan’dan AP’ye,” https://www.bbc.com/turkce/live/haberler-turkiye-43413735 March 15, 2018.
Gokhan Bacik is a Political Scientist at the Palacký University, Czech Republic
GSPI does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GSPI, its staff, or its trustees.
